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10A/NOAC
 00-0226-86
 06 MAR 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

FROM: [REDACTED] 25X1
 Director of Communications

SUBJECT: Office of Communications Comments on Items of
 Interest to the National Operations Security
 Advisory Committee [REDACTED] 25X1

REFERENCE: OS 6 2043, dated 24 February 1986, Same Subject

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to confirm the 3 March 1986 secure telephone conversation between [REDACTED] of the Office of Communications (OC), Communications Security Division and [REDACTED] of the Office of Security, Policy and Plans Staff. [REDACTED] 25X1
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2. On the proposed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) entitled National Operations Security Program: OC sees no need for the issuance of the proposed NSDD and recommends that the Central Intelligence Agency oppose it. The coordination and reporting mandated in the proposed NSDD would only serve to dilute the Director of Central Intelligence's ability to protect intelligence sources and methods. [REDACTED] 25X1

3. On the request for research and development (R&D) ideas in the Operations Security (OPSEC) area: We have no specific ideas to suggest. That is due in part to the lack of a clear definition of exactly what constitutes OPSEC. While we support the principle of R&D in all security disciplines, we share the view of the NOAC Chairman that not all counterintelligence and security functions are subsumed into OPSEC. Therefore, in advocating OPSEC R&D, we do so on the condition that OPSEC R&D must assume its proper priority in contention for R&D resources in other security areas. [REDACTED] 25X1
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24 FEB 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM:
Director of Security

25X1

SUBJECT: Request for Comments on Items of Interest to
the National Operations Security Advisory
Committee

1. The National OPSEC Advisory Committee (NOAC) met on 19 February 1986. Two items were presented at the meeting about which you may wish to comment, a proposed OPSEC National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) and a request for ideas concerning potential areas which could benefit from OPSEC research and development.

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2. The proposed OPSEC NSDD (copy attached) would impose certain requirements on CIA:

- Application and direction of OPSEC by line managers or commanders
- Positive education/awareness programs
- Coordination with other departments/agencies
- Annual Report on status of OPSEC in CIA

The NSDD also proposes that a new Senior Interagency Group (SIG) be created and that CIA participate in an NSA-led program of training, education and R&D. Addressees are requested to comment on the impact of such an NSDD on CIA activities and to suggest what the CIA posture should be on this proposal.

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2. The request for research and development ideas in the OPSEC area came from NOAC Chairman John Donnelly. His 10 Feb 1986 memorandum and relevant excerpts from the 1984 IR&DC study are attached. Your input in response to that

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request is invited. General comments and observations are also welcome. Short responses or questions may be telephoned to

Policy and Plans Staff/OS, on secure extension

Because both issues are likely to be discussed during the 4 March 1986 Interagency Group/Countermeasures meeting, please respond not later than noon, 3 March.

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Attachments

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
Interagency Group/Countermeasures

Washington, D.C. 20505


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**MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS, NATIONAL OPERATIONS SECURITY
ADVISORY COMMITTEE****SUBJECT: IR&DC Study OPSEC Recommendation on R&D to counter
the foreign intelligence threat** 


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 The IR&DC study,* excerpt attached, addresses imagery and electronic intelligence and other technical threats, and appears to conclude that OPSEC is the solution to countering any threat posed by the ability of the other side to intercept and interpret these indicators.


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 I do not believe that all command counterintelligence and security functions are subsumed into OPSEC. In Defense, we expect commanders to assess their vulnerabilities, consider the threat, make a net evaluation as to the depth of protection necessary, if any, and then take the necessary measures to counter the perceived threat.


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 We provide these commanders with threat advisories to enable them to take appropriate OPSEC measures. As you know, we have in place the SATRAN system that tracks satellite reconnaissance activity and notifies interested commanders. The IR&DC suggests a concern about the adequacy of that system in the near term. We have not been aware of shortfalls here, but I ask the military members to assess SATRAN from their aspect.

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 We have in place, also, a system for notifying DoD, DOE, and others of unscheduled special interest civil aircraft entering US airspace. I have no indications that that system is not adequate.

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* R&D to Counter the Foreign Intelligence Threat - A Technical
Assessment  September 1984).

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 A member of my DoD staff has been assigned to the IR&DC Technical Advisory Forum, which recommends R&D activity to aid CI/CM efforts. That person has participated in each of the six meetings held thus far and has tabled several suggestions for R&D. Among those suggestions were -

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- A system of emergency destruction of sensitive material that would not alert, say, a foreign government that the US was destroying its codes, etc., on an emergency basis.

- A means of countering overhead acquisition of radar imagery.

- A radar reflective camouflage netting for field use.

 The forum did not accept the emergency destruction initiative because Navy and others are already working that problem. On the radar countermeasures, the forum--on which nearly everyone is an engineer or scientist--did not believe that there was a threat from that area.

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 In order to develop a clear course of action for discussion at the forthcoming NOAC meeting, I would appreciate it if the members would review the IR&DC excerpt, attached, and propose areas in their agencies in which OPSEC may benefit from the IR&DC assumptions, conclusions, and recommendation.

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John F. Donnelly
Chairman, National Operations
Security Advisory Committee

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